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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that adjusting Stump and Kretzmann’s “atemporal 
duration” with la durée, a key concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), can 
respond to the most significant objections aimed at Stump and Kretzmann’s re-
interpretation of Boethian eternity. This paper deals with three of these objections: the 
incoherence of the notion of “atemporal duration,” the impossibility of this duration being 
time-like and the problems involved in conceiving it as being related to temporal duration 
by a relation of analogy. I conclude that “atemporal duration” (which has unfortunately 
come to be regarded with suspicion by most analytic philosophers of religion) – when 
combined with Bergson’s durée to become an “atemporal durée” – is a coherent 
understanding of divine eternity. 
 
I. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that adjusting Stump and Kretzmann’s “atemporal 
duration”1 with la durée, a key concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), can 
                                               
1 See Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity”, The Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 8 (1981). 
respond to the most significant objections aimed at their re-interpretation of Boethian 
eternity.2 
 Despite the fact that a significant part of the debate triggered by Stump and 
Kretzmann’s “Eternity” (1981) took place over twenty years ago, it remains a locus classicus 
for treatments of the relation between God and time in analytic philosophy of religion.3 This 
paper positions itself in line with constructive developments of the notion of eternity as 
“atemporal duration” proposed by Stump and Kretzmann, which has now been 
predominantly abandoned by the majority of analytic philosophers. Responding to the 
objections by strengthening their intuitions about divine timelessness with Bergson’s 
philosophy could reintroduce “atemporal duration” as a legitimate option when considering 
the nature of eternity. 
 Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in Bergson’s philosophy of time 
outside the continental tradition to which he is most usually consigned.4 Bergson’s thought 
seems worth investigating within the context of analytic philosophy of religion, not only 
because of Bergson’s connection with Boethius through his interest in Neoplatonism,5 but 
also because Bergson and analytic philosophy of religion share an extensive list of common 
questions (e.g., the problem of free will,6 the disanalogies between space and time, or the 
nature of possibility and necessity). This paper will show that a Bergsonian understanding of 
divine time can neutralise the apparent antinomic trichotomy between the following: 
                                               
2 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1973), 423. 
3 See for example J. Diekemper, “Eternity, Knowledge and Freedom”, Religious Studies 49, no. 1 (2013); 
Ryan T. Mullins, “Simply Impossible: A Case Against Divine Simplicity”, Journal of Reformed Theology 7, no. 2 
(2013); C. De Florio and A. Frigerio, “In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human Free Will 
and Divine Foreknowledge”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78, no. 1 (2015); Paul Helm, 
“Eternity and Vision in Boethius”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1, no. 1 (2009). 
4 See for example A. Mutch, “The Limits of Process: On (Re)Reading Henri Bergson”, Organization 23, no. 6 
(2016); Stephen E. Robbins, “On Time, Memory and Dynamic Form”, Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2004), 
762–88; Clifford Williams, “A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time”, Philosophy 73, no. 285 (1998); Sonja 
Deppe, “The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-
Theorists)”, Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (2016); Sebastian Olma, “Physical Bergsonism and the 
Worldliness of Time”, Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 6 (2007), 123–37; Adam Riggio, “Lessons for the 
Relationship of Philosophy and Science From the Legacy of Henri Bergson”, Social Epistemology 30, no. 2 
(2016). 
5 See W. J. Hankey, One Hundred Years of Neoplatonism in France: A Brief Philosophical History (Peters, 
2006), 106–19; Rose-Marie Mossé-Bastide, Bergson et Plotin (Presses Universitaires de France, 1959); Henri 
Bergson, Histoire de l’idée de temps. Cours au Collège de France 1902-1903 (Presses Universitaires de France, 
2016). 
6 See for example Michael Rota, “The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine 
Foreknowledge”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2, no. 1 (2010); Christoph Jäger, “Molinism and 
Theological Compatibilism”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5, no. 1 (2013). 
(i) regarding God’s time as a static, frozen, lifeless instant,7 (ii) claiming that God’s life is not 
such an instant, that it has extended duration, although this duration cannot be divided into 
subphases (Stump and Kretzmann), (iii) regarding “atemporal duration” as not consisting of 
discrete subphases and yet as having ordered relations between its points (Brian Leftow’s 
quasi-temporal eternity8). Such a project requires some crucial qualifications: 
 First, I will not engage with the debate about A- and B- series. This is because – 
unless indicated otherwise – the considerations of God’s relation to time which I will be 
discussing below apply to A- and B-theories of time equally. Perhaps more importantly, 
despite my partial reservations about his interpretation of Bergson, I side with the 
conclusion of C. Williams’ argument which attempts to show that Bergson’s critique applies 
to both sides of the A-B distinction.9 It might be still be said, however, as R. T. Mullins 
does,10  that although the A- and B-series may not be crucial to debates about God and 
Time, there still remains a fundamental ontological difference between presentism, 
eternalism and the growing-block theory. This is a general problem for any conception of 
the God-time relation that insists on omniscience. I will briefly discuss this problem in 
section 5. 
 Second, it is important to note that there is a threefold movement in the trajectory 
of the Bergsonian corpus. In his earliest works, la durée is used primarily as an 
epistemological category pertaining to the phenomenology of time in consciousness.11 
Later, it “moves outwards” and is attributed to the external world,12 concluding with the 
claim about a hierarchy of durations, creating a “super-science”13 of durées in Creative 
                                               
7 For a critique of the “lifelessness” of the eternal instant, see William Kneale, “Time and Eternity in 
Theology”, Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 61 (1985); Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism 
(Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 12; Robert C. Coburn, “Professor Malcolm on God”, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 2 (1963), 155–56; William Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge (Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 151; Richard Swinburne, “God and Time”, in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Honor of Norman 
Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump (Cornell University Press, 1993), 216; Paul Helm, Eternal God. A Study of God 
without Time (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
8 See Brian Leftow, “Boethius on Eternity”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1990). 
9 See Williams, “A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time”; Clifford Williams, “The Metaphysics of A- and B-
Time”, The Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 194 (1996). 
10 See Ryan T. Mullins, The End of the Timeless God (Oxford University Press, 2016), 22–30. 
11 See Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Presses Universitaires de France, 
2013). 
12 See Henri Bergson, Matière et mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à l’esprit (Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2012). 
13 Jean Milet, Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal ou La raison et le temps (Presses Universitaires de France, 
1974), 100. 
Evolution.14 The question about where it is legitimate to stop this move from an ontological 
perspective is rather complicated.15 For the purposes of this paper, where I will be talking 
about divine duration as a mode of God’s being, it suffices to limit Bergson’s views to the 
first stage. That is, I identify durée with the time of consciousness immediately accessible by 
introspection. 
 Third, I will not be engaging with the problems of ET-simultaneity: my aim is solely to 
investigate “atemporal duration” which I take to be separate and separable from it.16 
 In what follows, I will first provide a short account of the relevant features of 
Bergson’s philosophy of time. Second, I will outline key aspects of Stump and Kretzmann’s 
“atemporal duration” and objections against it. In the third part, I will stipulate that the 
“duration” in “atemporal duration” be taken as equivalent to Bergson’s la durée and 
demonstrate how such a stipulation responds to these objections. 
 
II. Bergson on Time 
The main emphasis of Bergson’s thought is on the radical difference between time and 
space: 
All through the history of philosophy time and space have been placed on the same level 
and treated as things of a kind; the procedure has been to study space, to determine its 
nature and function, and then to apply to time the conclusions thus reached. … To pass from 
one to the other one had only to change a single word: ‘juxtaposition’ was replaced by 
‘succession.’17 
Bergson thinks that this confusion is most pertinent in the way philosophy since Kant has 
understood the time of consciousness. Symptomatic of this confusion, Bergson says, is the 
frequent appeal to the analogy of a line as a helpful tool to schematise the progression of 
mental states in our mind:18 
                                               
14 See Henri Bergson, L’Évolution créatrice (Presses Universitaires de France, 2007). 
15 See Frédéric Worms, “Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson”, Épokhè 
94, no. 4 (1994), especially 101-109. 
16 For a survey of objections against ET-simultaneity, see Delmas Lewis, “Eternity Again: A Reply to Stump 
and Kretzmann”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15, no. 1/2 (1984); Helm, Eternal God. A Study 
of God without Time. I fully endorse Helm’s claim that ‘ET-simultaneity has no independent merit or use, 
nothing is illuminated or explained by it. Its sole purpose is to avoid the alleged reductio [by Kenny and 
Swinburne], which it does’ (idem, 33) and that ‘while [it] is formally consistent it does not actually advance 
understanding.’ (idem, 97) 
17 Henri Bergson, Creative Mind (Dover Publications, 2007), 4. 
18 See for example Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge University Press, 1998), A33/B50. 
we set [our states of consciousness] side by side in such a way as to perceive them 
simultaneously, … alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space, we express 
duration [la durée] in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous 
line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another.19 
Specifically, the moment we start to think about mental states given to our consciousness as 
forming a succession, we presume that some of them come “before” or “after” others. 
However, Bergson argues that for two of our mental states to be related by a “before and 
after” relation, they both have to be accessible to consciousness at once, i.e., at the same 
time, similarly to the way that objects in space coexist.20 The “time” that we normally 
appeal to when considering the temporal development of our consciousness is a primary 
example of what Bergson calls “spatialized time” (le temps spatialisé).21 Understanding our 
consciousness as line-like (analogous to and representable by a line progressing in space) 
and potentially homogeneous (i.e., divisible into intervals equal in length) is primarily driven 
by practical utility. One need only to realise how useful it is to conceive time in this way: our 
calendars are based on the possibility of representing past, present and future 
appointments “coexisting together” on a single page of our journal, laid out simultaneously 
in two-dimensional space. 
 Bergson argues that the notion of homogeneity is simply a reaction against the 
heterogeneity that lies at the bottom of our conscious experience.22  This heterogeneity 
consists of Bergson’s key concept of la durée. La durée is a concept notoriously difficult 
succinctly to describe, not least due to its opposition to ordinary conceptual ways of 
thinking implicated by language – it is precisely its resistance to a simple description by 
language, similarly to the difficulty in describing the content of qualia, for example, that has 
contributed to its neglect in early analytic philosophy.23 Nevertheless, similarly to qualia, it 
                                               
19 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (George Allen & Co, 
1913), 101. 
20 Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 76; Henri Bergson, Durée et Simultanéité. À 
Propos de La Théorie d’Einstein (Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), 46. 
21 The charge of “spatialised time” refers to the application of spatial categories to consciousness: it is not 
equivalent to the frequent charge, directed at eternalists or B-theorists, that they “spatialise time.” Bergson’s 
charge of spatialising applies to A- and B-theorists equally, since it is not a claim about temporal ontology, but 
a claim about the temporal representation of consciousness. See especially Philippe Soulez and Frédéric 
Worms, Bergson. Biographie (Flammarion, 1997), 56; Worms, “Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace 
dans l’œuvre de Bergson”. 
22 Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 72–73. 
23 See Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Bergson”, The Monist 22, no. 3 (1912); Karin Costelloe, “An 
Answer to Mr Bertrand Russell’s Article on the Philosophy of Bergson”, The Monist 24, no. 1 (1914); see also 
Frédéric Worms, “Bergson entre Russell et Husserl: Un troisième terme?”, Rue Descartes , no. 29 (2000). 
is not an obscure concept, and language can very successfully point us to what the term 
itself refers to. 
 In Creative Mind, Bergson provides the following account of la durée, as the gradual 
movement of mental states in our consciousness: 
It is … [an] indivisible and indestructible continuity of a melody where the past enters into 
the present and forms with it an undivided whole which remains undivided and even 
indivisible in spite of what is added at every instant … [A]s soon as we seek an intellectual 
representation of it we line up, one after another, states which have become distinct like the 
beads of a necklace …24 
 
It is a succession of states each one of which announces what follows and contains what 
precedes. Strictly speaking they do not constitute multiple states until I have got beyond 
them and turned around to observe their trail.25 
In Time and Free Will Bergson describes la durée as a 
qualitative multiplicity, with no likeness to number; an organic evolution … ; a pure 
heterogeneity within which there are no distinct qualities. In a word, the moments of inner 
duration are not external to one another.26 
In la durée, the preceding states of consciousness have a qualitative influence on the ones 
that follow. For example, whenever we read a new book, our attitude and aesthetic feeling 
derived from the act of reading contain the series of mental states (emotions, memories) 
leading up to its reading. Similarly, whenever we read the same book again, the memories 
of past instances of its reading are “included” in the act of reading it at the present time; 
“included” not in the sense of containment, but “included” in that the present reading of 
the book would have been different without the past one. For this reason, la durée is 
unrepeatably different at every point of its development. Bergson also describes la durée 
with the seemingly contradictory phrase of “qualitative multiplicity,” which is clarified by 
Pilkington as follows: 
The notion of ‘qualitative plurality’ might seem a contradictory one, since to speak of a 
‘plurality’ at all is to envisage the particulars which compose it as being in some sense 
juxtaposed, … . Bergson however is compelled to use whatever resources language offers 
him, in order to describe duration; to grasp the notion of ‘pure duration,’ one must conceive 
of a succession, which is not separated into a series of discrete states; it is a series of 
qualitative transformations which flow into each other …27  
                                               
24 Bergson, Creative Mind, 55. 
25 Bergson, Creative Mind, 137. 
26 Bergson, Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 226. 
27 A. E. Pilkington, Bergson and His Influence. A Reassessment (Cambridge University Press, 1976), 3–4. 
Furthermore, Bergson instructs us to observe that this ever-changing development of our 
consciousness must be construed as indivisible. Take Bergson’s example of falling in love 
with someone: when introspecting ourselves, we can never clearly pinpoint the moment at 
which our feeling of mild affection “turned” into love – the transition from one to the other 
is as gradual as the progression from one colour to another on the colour spectrum. Where 
does one colour and the other begin? The colour spectrum28 can also be used to illustrate 
the following seemingly incompatible claims: according to Bergson, la durée (i) can never be 
precisely divided into distinct segments, (ii) proceeds in “succession” and (iii) it is a 
multiplicity. (i) The colour spectrum consists of a gradual change from one colour to another 
– all divisions of the spectrum into distinct colours (“green,” “light blue,” “yellow”), will 
always be imprecise. They result from the casting of a “spatial” net over the heterogeneous 
continuity of the spectrum in order to extract distinct elements from it. Once we divide it 
into separate colours, we lose the distinct feature of gradual progression, almost an 
imperceptible shift from one to the other. This is what Deleuze has in mind when he says 
that la durée cannot be divided without changing in kind.29  (ii) Nevertheless, the fact that 
the elements composing the spectrum cannot be divided does not exclude their succession, 
the change that happens as we go from one side of the spectrum to another; thus there is, 
paradoxically, a succession (i.e., continuous change) with no distinct elements that succeed 
(since in our immediate phenomenological perception of change, as opposed to its 
retrospectively broken-up representation, there are no distinct elements). (iii) Despite the 
fact that the spectrum is indivisible (or rather, that any division we impose upon it will 
always be imprecise and incapable of capturing the immediate phenomenological impact 
the spectrum has on us as we gradually move our attention from one colour to the next), it 
is nevertheless a multiplicity (otherwise it would simply be one, consisting of a single 
colour). 
 The metaphor of the colour spectrum can further be used to illustrate another 
paramount concept of Bergson’s philosophy, that of what Vladimir Jankélévitch refers to as 
“the illusion of retrospectivity.”30 Consider the experience of looking at an LED lamp that 
changes so that it gradually goes through the entire colour spectrum. What is the most 
                                               
28 See Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 42. 
29 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (Zone Books, 1991), 40. 
30 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson (Duke University Press, 2015), 11–17. 
accurate description of the way our consciousness perceives the LED lamp? At the moment 
of looking at it, its changing qualia form a continuous shift of one quality to another – we 
can only isolate distinct colours in it by “jumping back” in our mind by a few seconds and 
identifying that the colour, say, green has just turned into blue. Furthermore, we can lay out 
all of our memories of the colours in the past and turn them into the colour spectrum itself 
which becomes spread out in two-dimensional or three-dimensional space. It is only on this 
spectrum itself that we may impose imperfect divisions of colours and establish relations of 
before and after. This is what Bergson has in mind when he says that “Strictly speaking 
[states of consciousness] do not constitute multiple states until I have got beyond them and 
turned around to observe their trail.” The present of la durée is indivisible: “when we think 
we are dividing it, we are dividing its spatial transcription … .”31 Similarly, when looking at 
the lamp, we cannot differentiate the individual colours. The relation between the LED lamp 
and the spatially represented colour spectrum it goes through is analogous to that between 
la durée and the image it has left of itself in our memory.  
 The relation between la durée and the trace of its development in our memory also 
partially clarifies the claim about indivisibility of la durée from point (i) above; the 
prohibition on construing la durée as indivisible is not a contribution to the debate about 
whether time is discrete (i.e., that a moment of time cannot be further divided into smaller 
moments) or continuous (i.e., that for any two moments of time, there is another moment 
between them), it is rather an observation that the negotiation of these questions applies to 
spatialised time only (which constitutes the form through which we perceive our past), but 
cannot apply to the phenomenology of our immediate temporal experience.32 Regardless of 
whether objective time measured by clocks in the external world is divisible or indivisible, la 
durée, or the time of consciousness, is indivisible. Similarly, although it might be objected 
that the colour spectrum can always be divided, albeit imperfectly, Bergson’s point is to 
stress that the division cannot be accomplished without changing the nature of the thing 
being divided. Before the division, we have a gradual qualitative progression from one 
                                               
31 “Quand on croit la diviser, on divise [sa] transcription spatiale ….” Milet, Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal 
ou La raison et le temps, 55 my translation. 
32 As I have mentioned above, in Bergson’s later works, la durée moves outwards and, as a category, is 
applied to the totality of physical reality. The limitations of this paper force me to put questions of temporal 
ontology on the side; here I am primarily limiting Bergson’s contribution to questions of the phenomenology of 
temporal experience and thus focus mainly on his earlier works. 
colour to another (either as we move our eyes from one side of the spectrum to another or 
as we observe the LED lamp), after the division we move from one colour to another in 
sudden jumps. While the gap between the quality of the thing before division and after 
division may not seem so strange in the case of colours, in the case of the feeling of falling in 
love with someone that I have mentioned above, we can notice a much more radical 
difference between the presently lived experience of a continuous development of our 
mental states (e.g., emotions towards the person loved), the indivisible process of falling in 
love with someone, and the retrospective identification of various stages of this process 
(“vague interest” at t1, “strong affection” at t2 and “love” at t3). 
 Apart from stipulating the realm of la durée and that of spatial multiplicity, which 
intrudes into the pure heterogeneity of our mental states as a “ghost of space haunting the 
reflexive consciousness,”33 Bergson also provides an analysis of how this intrusion takes 
place. He argues that the phenomenon of movement is one where space and la durée come 
dangerously close; dangerously so, because they become mixed. Frédéric Worms describes 
the process of our consciousness grasping movement in a twofold manner. On the one 
hand, there is what he calls “temporalisation of space” (temporalisation de l’espace34) – the 
moving body is grasped by our durée; it is only thanks to our memory as conscious beings 
that movement and change can be perceived in the external world in the first place. Imagine 
watching the movement of a clock pendulum from left to right: 
Outside of me, in space, there is never more than a single position of the hand and the 
pendulum, …  It is because I endure … that I picture to myself what I call the past oscillations 
of the pendulum at the same time as I perceive the present oscillation. Now, let us withdraw 
for a moment the ego which thinks these so-called successive oscillations: there will never 
be more than a single oscillation, and indeed only a single position, of the pendulum, and 
hence no duration.35 
On the other hand, this process also causes the “spatialisation of la durée” (spatialisation de 
la durée36). Now, Bergson claims that movements of objects are given to consciousness as 
undivided singular qualities.37 By shifting our attention from the indivisible qualitative 
impression of movement of the moving object (best observed in the example of quickly 
                                               
33 Bergson, Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 95. 
34 Worms, “Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson”, 93. 
35 Bergson, Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 108. 
36 Worms, “Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson”, 93. 
37 Bergson, Matière et mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à l’esprit, 209–15. 
moving objects, e.g., of a falling star38) to the trajectory in space traversed by that 
movement, we inevitably come to identify it with the trajectory itself. Furthermore, since 
the moments of our durée are connectible with positions of space where the object was at 
different points of the trajectory and since this trajectory (qua a curve or a line in space) is 
geometrically divisible, we come to think that this divisibility applies to the durée which 
constituted the original experience of perceiving the movement as well.39 Thereby we make 
two mistakes: first, we fail to see that all movement is given to our consciousness as pure 
quality; second, we import all the categories pertaining to the completed trajectory of the 
moving object to durée. 
 On a side note, it is for all these reasons that Bergson argues that la durée is 
inaccessible to mathematics. For example, in measuring speed, we focus on simultaneities 
between the positions of moving objects in space to establish relations between them, but 
the durée which constituted our being able to perceive movement in the first place does not 
appear in the equations.40 Once the movement has taken place, we note the position of the 
body at point A and then at point B and compare these with the positions of, say, the hands 
of a clock; the movement itself which happens between the end and starting point 
disappears. “Velocity is therefore only a measurement of immobilities in comparison, it 
indicates the extremities of movement, not the interval.”41 Furthermore, mechanics, 
Bergson argues, always operate with facts taken as accomplished, never with acts being 
accomplished42 and since, as has been argued above, the fait accompli refers merely to the 
trace which la durée has left in its past and not to la durée, la durée itself does not and 
cannot appear in mechanical equations. It is here important to keep in mind that Bergson’s 
accusation against the objective mathematical description of time is not that it is logically 
inconsistent, but rather that it fails to grasp the phenomenological aspect of change in our 
consciousness. The difference between the time of physics and the time of consciousness 
can be clarified by considering Le Poidevin’s discussion of a psychological experiment with 
children conducted by Jean Piaget, which demonstrated that despite an objectively 
                                               
38 Bergson, Durée et Simultanéité. À Propos de La Théorie d’Einstein, 93. 
39 This is treated at length in Bergson, Durée et Simultanéité. À Propos de La Théorie d’Einstein, 41–67; see 
also Henri Bergson, La Pensée et le mouvant. Essais et conférences (Presses Universitaires de France, 2013), 
157–62. 
40 Bergson, Durée et Simultanéité. À Propos de La Théorie d’Einstein, 67. 
41 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy (Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 16. 
42 Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 89. 
homogeneous movement of water between two flasks of different shapes, the children 
report that the time it took for the water to move was different, depending on the shape of 
the flask, thus pointing to a gap between external objective temporality and time of 
consciousness.43 Le Poidevin says: 
For these children, suggests Piaget, …, time is plastic: it expands when the movement of 
water is slow, and contracts when the movement is fast. A greater displacement of water, 
or, more generally, a greater amount of activity, must, on this view of the world, take more 
time.44 
Piaget interprets this rather bizarre phenomenon superficially appearing to involve “an 
incorrect understanding of the relationships between motion (or change in general), speed, 
and duration”45 by the child’s egocentric understanding of time, an understanding which 
has not yet reached the stage of grasping time as homogeneous and uniform.46 Bergson, on 
the other hand, would phrase the meaning of the above experiment differently. He would 
claim that although the position and physical “speed” of the water moving from the top 
vessel to the bottom one may have been equal, the internal experience that this has caused 
in the children’s durée was different – nevertheless, the children’s subjective perception of 
the water moving was required for them to talk about temporal experience in the first 
place. 
 
III. Atemporal Duration 
Putting Bergson aside for the time being, I will now provide a brief outline of Stump and 
Kretzmann’s concept of “atemporal duration” and the most significant objections against it 
following the publication of “Eternity” in 1981.47 
 Stump and Kretzmann’s discussion of eternity begins by identifying four aspects of 
Boethius’ famous definition of eternity as “simultaneous and perfect possession of 
boundless life” (interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio).48 (i) God has a life. 
                                               
43 Robin Le Poidevin, The Images of Time. An Essay on Temporal Representation (Oxford University Press, 
2007), 34–35. 
44 Le Poidevin, The Images of Time. An Essay on Temporal Representation, 35. 
45 Le Poidevin, The Images of Time. An Essay on Temporal Representation, 35. 
46 J. Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Time (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 48. 
47 As I mentioned in my introduction, this section is concerned only with atemporal duration and not with 
ET-simultaneity, which I take to be separable from it. 
48 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 422–25. 
Eternity is not comparable to the mode of existence of, for example, universals, numbers or 
truths.49 (ii) God’s life is illimitable: it has neither a beginning nor an ending in time. While 
Stump and Kretzmann briefly consider the possibility of this “illimitability” referring to the 
lack of limits of a single instant of time (“what cannot be extended, cannot be limited in its 
extent”50), in the end, they read Boethius’ understanding of eternity as “beginningless, 
endless, infinite duration.”51 (iii) God’s life is a duration. While they do acknowledge that it 
is a duration of “a special sort,”52 this follows directly from their understanding of 
“illimitability” from the preceding point. (iv) God possesses his entire life at once (tota 
simul). According to them, all the “events” of God’s life are mutually simultaneous. These 
four points, in turn, lead them to conclude that eternity is an “atemporal duration,” which is 
characterised by the following four features: 
 First, there is no earlier or later in God’s life: its events are mutually simultaneous 
and present, but cannot be sequentially ordered.53 They also argue that there cannot be 
subphases of this duration.54 Second, while eternity is a duration, it is a duration that does 
not consist of a succession of events: “no eternal entity has existed or will exist, it only 
exists.”55 Third, the sense of “duration” in “atemporal duration” cannot be taken to mean 
“persistence through time,” as it is used in common parlance. Stump and Kretzmann 
acknowledge that such a sense of “duration” “violates established usage: but [that] an 
attempt to convey a new philosophical or scientific concept by adapting familiar expressions 
is not to be rejected on the basis of its violation of ordinary usage.”56 Moreover, they 
believe that atemporal duration grounds all other forms of duration. Replying to Nelson 
who criticises them for being caught in either an equivocal or a univocal use of “duration” in 
relation to God and temporal phenomena,57 Stump and Kretzmann argue for an analogical 
use of “duration” and conclude that  
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53 Stump and Kretzmann, “Eternity”, 434. 
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[a]temporal duration is the genuine, paradigmatic duration, of which temporal duration is 
only the moving image. … [I]t is the basis of all temporal duration, any instance of which is 
correctly called duration only analogically since it is only a partial manifestation of the 
paradigmatic, genuine duration … .”58 
Fourth, despite atemporal duration’s indivisibility, successionlessness and complete 
simultaneity, Stump and Kretzmann believe that Boethius’ duration is an extended duration, 
an “infinitely enduring” present.59 
 Soon after the publication of “Eternity,” objections against “atemporal duration” 
began to appear. While it is impossible to capture the entirety of the debate, the three 
strongest objections against Stump and Kretzmann’s position can be classified under three 
headings: 
 The first objection states that “atemporal duration” cannot be a “duration” at all, 
since a “duration” is an extension and “atemporal duration” does not satisfy conditions for 
extensionality.  For example, Fitzgerald observes that for any duration, it must be possible 
that “two particulars may both have the same or a different amount of the mode of 
extension in question.”60 This means that even if atemporal duration is infinitely extended, 
there must, at least in theory, be distinct subphases of duration, otherwise to apply the 
term extension to atemporal duration does not make sense. However, as has been 
mentioned above, Stump and Kretzmann reject the possibility of “atemporal duration” 
having distinct subphases. Fitzgerald concludes that for this reason in atemporal duration 
“we do not really have an extensive mode in eternality at all, given not only that past and 
future and earlier and later are inapplicable, but that there is no analogue of them.”61 
 The second objection concerns the problem of “atemporal duration” being a time-
like extension. In 1990, Leftow observed that “duration” in the Stump-Kretzmannian reading 
is supposed to be a timelike extension, although the use of “timelike” in this sense is of 
course highly analogical, as Stump and Kretzmann themselves concede.62 However, one 
cannot coherently speak of atemporal duration as a timelike extension in the way that they 
imagine because it leads to the following problem: “Arguably, what contains no distinct 
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points is not an extension at all [see Fitzgerald], and what contains distinct points, but not 
points ordered as earlier and later, may be an extension, but lacks the traits distinctive of 
temporal extension.”63  
 The third objection attacks the possibility of “duration” in “atemporal duration” 
being used in a sense analogical to “duration” in the temporal realm. This option was 
proposed by Stump and Kretzmann in their response to Fitzgerald to avoid the charge that 
“duration” in “atemporal duration” is used in an extremely deviant sense that has nothing in 
common with ordinary usage.64 Unfortunately, as Rogers observes,65 the appeal to analogy 
does not help. It does not seem like our experience, where we first encounter perfections 
predicable of God, presents us with anything at all that we could use to get a hold of 
atemporal duration or to use as a basis for analogising up to “atemporal duration:” “If we 
cannot, in however limited a way, show where the similarity lies between Creator and 
creature, we may use the same word of both, but we are using it equivocally.”66 
 
IV. Atemporal Durée 
The temporal development of our consciousness is roughly divided into two segments, with 
imprecise boundaries between them. On the one hand, there is that part of our 
consciousness consisting of the present moment. This roughly corresponds to what is 
sometimes referred to as the “specious present.”67 On the other hand, there is the past of 
our consciousness, accessible by memory. Now, the proportion of these two parts of our 
conscious history is different from person to person – some people can focus their attention 
for two or three seconds, some for more. Nevertheless, for all creatures whose 
consciousness develops in time, there is a qualitative difference between perception and 
memory. Now, Bergson states that this distinction must be held in conjunction with the 
conceptual difference between la durée and its trace in the past. It is only when we 
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remember the past development of la durée that we may attempt to identify distinct 
moments in is trace, stipulate relations of “before” and “after,” similarly to the way that we 
may split the memory of the immediate phenomenological perception of the LED lamp into 
distinct colours. In la durée, as it is developing, no such divisions can be made. 
 Now, imagine gradually extending the present attention of our consciousness into 
the past. For example, most people are able to focus their attention on one or two 
sentences at a time – imagine someone who could hold in one act of consciousness the 
entire act of reading a book, then a library etc. As we keep extending this present attention 
of la durée, the proportion between memory and present perception decreases. Finally, let 
us imagine a consciousness with such perfect attention that its durée would perfectly 
coincide with its memory.  The entirety of its conscious life (which is for human beings 
separated into the past and the present) would always be present, still developing (as the 
phenomenological qualia-like impression of the LED lamp) as a constant movement of 
consciousness. Bergson himself hypothesises such a durée as follows: 
An attention … sufficiently powerful … would thus include in an undivided present the entire 
past history of the conscious person, – not as instantaneity, not like a cluster of 
simultaneous parts, but as something continually present, which would also be something 
continually moving: such, I  repeat, is the melody which one perceives as indivisible, and 
which constitutes, from one end to the other … a perpetual present, although this 
perpetuity has nothing in common with immutability, or this indivisibility with instantaneity. 
What we have is a present which endures.68 
 My claim is that “atemporal duration” should be understood as such a “perpetual 
present,” i.e., la durée. This special instance of la durée can be characterised as follows: 
 First, the “time” of divine life as understood along Bergsonian lines is radically 
opposed to the temporal categories of mathematical or physical time. It is the time of 
consciousness, not a potentially infinitely divisible continuum with clear outlines, subphases, 
instants and points since divisions can only be effected imperfectly on the trace in the past 
of our durée. In this respect, God is temporal if “time” is taken as the time of consciousness, 
that is, durée, but God is timeless if “time” is taken as the objective time applicable to the 
external world. God’s life is an indivisible partless change.  
 Second, whenever we find ourselves speaking of distinct separable events in God’s 
life (e.g., of His “speaking to Moses” before “sending His Son”), we are only looking back at 
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the time passed in our durée, directly accessible by memory, and not time passing. We 
cannot separate such events in God’s durée in se, only in the trace it has left in our durée, 
quoad nos. That is because when we consider that God’s time is a “perpetual” continuously 
developing indivisible present, we realise that to speak of distinct events in God’s durée is as 
contradictory as identifying distinct subphases in the development of our present attention.  
 We cannot individuate mental states in our durée, but only once they have taken 
place and have become memory. This awareness of the difference between growing 
memory and perception is precisely what constitutes our awareness of the passage of time. 
Similarly, the development of God’s durée is indivisible as it is happening (which is always, 
i.e., the entirety of his durée is “ET-simultaneous” with every point of our durée), but we can 
conceive of its traces in our past being divided once certain events have happened from our 
temporal perspective and have become part of the memory of our durée. We see them in 
our past because our “specious present” is complemented by our memory. In the case of 
God, on the other hand, there is no separation between present and past.69 The reason why 
we cannot ask about the trace of past moments in God’s life in se is that, in se, there is no 
such trace – God’s memory perfectly overlaps with his present phenomenological attention. 
However, we may do so quoad nos, since those moments that have manifested themselves 
in our past are now retained by our memory and are thus subject to the topology of 
spatialised time. In this sense, there is “order” of events in divine life, but we must 
constantly be aware that when speaking of such an order, we are moving at the level of 
events that have been retained in our own memory. Now, the claim that God’s time is a 
perpetual, continuously developing, indivisible present seems to involve blatant 
contradictions. How can something change without going through stages of change? 
Responding to the charge of contradictions in Bergson’s definition of la durée would involve 
going into Bergson’s theory of language, and the way it relates to la durée, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, in passing, it should be stressed that the objective of 
Bergson’s method is not to provide a precise definition of la durée, but rather to use 
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language to point us to the fundamental experience of temporality immediately furnished 
by our consciousness, which has been covered up by inappropriate forms of thought 
borrowed from a realm inapplicable to it. When we are in the act of perceiving change, we 
are perceiving it as indivisible – in this respect, the change in our durée is indivisible and yet 
changing. The prima facie self-contradictory move of holding together both the notion of an 
“infinite specious present” and “temporally unextended awareness” suggested by Alston 
(see footnote 69) is further commented on by him as follows: 
The psychological concept of the specious present is intended to embody the possibility that 
one might be aware of a process without successively being aware of its temporal parts. But 
this does not imply that the awareness itself is a process without succession. … [T]he various 
stages of [God’s] life will not occur successively in time but will occur or ‘be given’ in one 
unity of felt immediacy.70 
 Third, the experience of such a durée is phenomenologically inaccessible to us. Some 
durées are completely unimaginable to ours because their rhythm is faster, more intense 
than that of our own, for example, the consciousness of a hypothetical human being able to 
perceive the spinning of electrons. Others are inaccessible because they are far slower, e.g., 
that of a hypothetical human able to perceive the movement of continents.71  Moore 
provides a fascinating illustration of this point: 
The story is told how Wittgenstein was walking with friends, and suggested that they should 
act out the solar system. … The real difficulties [of this game] are temporal. For to keep an 
apparent circular motion round my sun, I shall have to change my speed at each moment, 
going faster when I am going in the direction of the sun, and slowing down when I am going 
in the other direction. … If moon-Wittgenstein is to go at a feasible speed, the earth-
husband will have to be going very slowly, and the motion of the sun-wife will need to be 
imperceptible. ... In short, the experience of temporal process required by the game is 
inaccessible to us.72 
 Fourth, God has a life. But His life must be construed as an indivisible progress. The 
seemingly contradictory description of la durée as “indivisible change” has been clarified in 
section 2 with regards to the LED lamp and colour-spectrum examples; the paradoxical 
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notion of “indivisible progress” refers to the phenomenological awareness of change in our 
present attention which is indivisible. Our “specious present” is given to us as an indivisible 
unit of qualitative change, which is only divisible retrospectively, once the specious present 
has become part of our memory.  By looking back at God’s past dealings with the world, in 
which we can isolate events and speak of “God’s knowing something at 15:00” and “God’s 
knowing something at 15:01,” we are not operating at the level of God’s durée. An 
understanding of divine “time” as la durée means that there is “change” and development 
in God, but not a separation into temporal parts. He is “timeless” insofar as He is not 
divisible into temporal parts pertaining to physical time (since dividing His life in such a way 
implies operating on the mere shadow of the durée), but not “timeless” in the sense of 
there not being change in Him, although “change” here is used in the Bergsonian sense 
applicable to the phenomenology of temporal experience in consciousness. 
 How does identifying “atemporal duration” with la durée respond to the objections 
against Stump and Kretzmann raised at the end of section 3? First, from a Bergsonian 
perspective, Fitzgerald’s requirement for atemporal duration to consist of different 
“amounts” of duration does not make sense – we can speak of “amounts” of space 
(centimetres, metres), or amounts of physical time (hours, minutes), but not of durée, which 
is pure heterogeneous quality and therefore unquantifiable. By the same token, since God’s 
atemporal duration is durée which is happening, it does not make sense to speak of 
“positions” or “points” in it – when we are conceptualising divine eternity in such a way, we 
are merely looking back at God’s actions in our time as they happened in our own temporal 
perspective and as they are retained by our memory. In this respect the separation between 
our durée (separated into present attention and memory) and divine durée (the attention of 
the perpetual present) maps onto the following distinction posited by Stump and 
Kretzmann: 
[atemporal duration] is not made up of components at all, actual or potential; instead, it is 
potentially divisible conceptually. … [I]n his own nature God is pure actuality, but nothing in 
that claim prohibits our conceiving of God as successively actualizing various potentialities, 
when we conceive of him from our temporal point of view.73 
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Furthermore, this divisibility quoad nos only refers to the traces that God’s being has left in 
our memory. Whilst Stump and Kretzmann in the quote above speak of conceiving, in the 
present, of God as actualising possibles, on the Bergsonian reading this should only be 
limited to referring to the past as it is remembered by humans, to actions that God has 
performed before the present we are currently perceiving. 
 Second, similar considerations apply to Leftow’s objection – the atemporal durée 
does not contain points, either in succession (as he accuses Stump and Kretzmann of 
claiming) or points ordered by earlier/later relations. These can only be specified in 
retrospect. Nevertheless, its time-likeness is constituted by the analogical process of 
gradually overlapping our present attention and memory (which are clearly in a time-like 
relation). On the other hand, its “atemporality” is constituted by the impossibility of 
separating it into subphases in itself, but merely in its manifestation to our durée in the 
created realm. 
 Third, this way of conceiving God’s durée provides sufficient grounds for describing it 
as analogical. God’s durée is analogical to ours since our durée shares with His complete 
indivisibility. The indivisibility of the present attention constitutes the overlap, the similarity, 
with divine durée, the separation of our durée into present attention and memory 
constitutes the difference. We could imagine a hierarchy of durées (from Le Poidevin’s 
patients with brain injuries, through hypothetical people observing the movement of 
continents) going all the way up to God. In this way, God’s durée is at least conceptually 
related to ours. Nevertheless, it is also qualitatively different from ours, since it is always 
attentive to itself, with no separation between present perception and past memory in its 
perpetual present. By positing hypothetical entities whose attention spans longer and 
longer portions of human time, we can imagine ascending up to it, though never fully 
grasping it, since our own thought, even when perceiving our own selves, let alone 
conceiving of God, will always be subject to the separation of (i) the retrospectively divisible, 




It may be argued that although the identification of la durée with atemporal duration solves 
the three objections from above, it generates problems of its own. 
 The first problem concerns the ontological relationship between divine durée and 
our durée, which poses the following dilemma. On the one hand, Bergson argues that our 
consciousness clearly presents us with a “now” constituted by the conscious present and 
that for our durée the future does not exist in any sense. This seems to commit Bergson to 
presentism or the growing-block theory of time. On the other hand, I have argued that 
God’s durée merges memory and perception into a single indivisible perpetual present. 
Since God’s knowledge of Himself is identical with His knowledge of the world, it seems that 
(our) future must in a way exist in order for Him to know it.74 This seems to commit the 
model outlined above to eternalism. Which one do we accept? As I have mentioned above, 
this is not a problem unique to the Bergsonian take on “atemporal duration” presented in 
this paper, but a problem for any conception of divine eternity which insists both on 
omniscience and free will. However, Bergson aside, I agree with Shanley who claims that the 
focus on the debate about temporal ontology and God should be shifted to the utter 
dependency of creation on its Creator.75 For example, the question of whether God knows 
the future depending on whether it is already “there,” as eternalism seems to imply76 or 
whether he does not because it does not yet exist, as presentism or growing-block seem to 
suggest, is simply the wrong type of question to ask. God knows the future because he 
creates it, not because it is there or will be there for his “perceptual knowledge” to access. 
Theologians should move away from the tendency to first picture independently existing 
temporal reality (Bergsonian or not), then an independently existing God and trying to 
establish epistemic relations between them, especially considering the fact that this project 
usually tends to fail. Once we shift our focus from independent temporal ontology to God’s 
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creative action, it is not so surprising that, as Mullins points out, most of the medieval 
theologians insisting on eternity, omniscience and free will, were, rather counterintuitively, 
presentists.77 
 The second objection concerns the difference between divine atemporal duration 
(or atemporal “durée”) and human duration. I have shown that there is sufficient overlap 
between our durée and divine durée. But has the distinction between them not collapsed? If 
our durée is indivisible and God’s durée is too, also characterised by a perpetual change, 
does anything prevent us from saying that our own consciousness is also an example of 
atemporal duration? Here the response is rather simple; there is an analogy between our 
durée in the present moment and the divine atemporal duration, but ours is different since 
we are subject to progression in time and the separation of present perception and 
memory. Nothing of this sort applies to the divine durée.  
 Third, it may be objected that we cannot identify time with consciousness. Some 
philosophers indeed draw a tight connection between consciousness and time (thus 
qualitatively differentiating time from space which, arguably, can be conceived without 
appeal to the presence of a human mind).78 I have not shown that time is dependent for its 
existence on the human mind. To respond to the first objection, I must reiterate the claim 
from my Introduction where I have intentionally limited Bergson’s durée to consciousness. 
As has been demonstrated above, to move away from physical time as a means of fleshing 
out the content of “atemporal duration” and instead model its properties on la durée as a 
more accurate way of capturing the phenomenological qualia of consciousness provides a 
more coherent way of conceiving atemporal duration. This move away from physical time to 
la durée, with its concomitant distinction between perception and memory (i.e., the present 
and past of consciousness) also explains why certain topological features of physical time 
(e.g., its divisibility into distinct segments, points etc.) are inapplicable to la durée and, by 
extension, to Stump and Kretzmann’s “atemporal duration.” 
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VI. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, it might be objected that I have merely blurred the distinctions 
between divine timelessness and divine temporality. In what respect is the “perpetual 
present” a version of divine timelessness? Was not Stump’ and Kretzmann’s intention from 
the beginning to preserve the idea of a timeless duration? But here, it must be repeated 
that we are forced to make a distinction between timelessness and duration only if we 
accept physical, objective time as somehow providing the means for capturing the divine 
mode of being: it is time modelled on objects existing in the physical universe that forces us 
to decide between (i) God existing outside of physical time, thus having none (or not all) of 
the properties applicable to physical time or (ii) a God existing somehow in this physical 
time but not subject to some of its limitations.79 Neither of these has so far provided a 
satisfactory way of understanding what “atemporal duration” is. On the contrary, by moving 
to the phenomenology of time of consciousness, captured by Bergson’s concept of la durée, 
we can not only remove some of the contradictions caused by importing the topology of 
physical time into “atemporal duration,” but also use our own immediately accessible 
consciousness as a tangible bedrock on which to establish relations of analogy between 
human durée and divine durée. The Bergsonian “perpetual present” is atemporal in that it is 
not subject to change in physical time, but it is a “duration” in that it has a durée.80 
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